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The Polish President Andrzej Duda has just announced that on 10 and 11 November a
referendum will be held in Poland on the need to amend the Constitution, in which he will
put to the Polish people numerous questions arising from ongoing public consultations.
This consultative referendum is an attempt to delegitimise the Constitution, on which the
referendum’s own legitimacy is based (Article 125 states that a referendum can be held on
matters “of particular importance to the state”).
President Duda has been trying for some time to convince citizens that the current
Constitution, which is barely 20 years old, is outdated. He has even advanced the bizarre
argument that every generation should have its own constitution, and that young people
such as his daughter (currently studying law) did not vote in the current one.
The President has a second, anti-elite argument: that the current method of constitutional
amendment is undemocratic. According to Article 235 of the Constitution, amendments
require a qualified majority in both houses of parliament; if an amendment concerns key
chapters of the Constitution, a referendum is also required. President Duda argues that
amendments are prepared by the elite, with their outcomes only presented to citizens for
their approval. Therefore on this occasion, instead of amending the Constitution in the
usual manner, the President has taken the road less travelled: a general consultative
referendum under Article 125. Despite its “consultative” nature, the referendum will be
binding if participation exceeds 50% of the electorate.
The President’s consultations on the subject of amending the Constitution are no doubt
motivated by the hope of a binding result despite his political camp’s lack of a constitutional
majority in parliament. Although ostensibly extensive, the Presidential consultations over
the amendment are not entirely open: after all, he determines the participants and the
agenda. For instance, the crucial issue for the President is whether Poles prefer the
parliamentary-cabinet system of government or a presidential one. The President naturally
supports a change towards the latter.
Another of the President’s favour topics for discussion is the issue of primacy of the Polish
Constitution over European law. Despite holding a PhD in law, the President seems to have
forgotten that Article 8 of the Constitution clearly stipulates that the Constitution is the
highest law in Poland and that the Polish Constitutional Tribunal has on several occasions
proved this hierarchical advantage in assessing whether the European treaties comply with
the Polish Constitution.
What is more, in the eyes of the President, not all constitutional topics are created equal:
the presidential consultations show no willingness in to tackle subjects such as increasing
the independence of the judiciary or amending the constitutional definition of marriage as a
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union between a man and a woman, which for many is an obstacle to the legalization of
same-sex marriage in Poland.
The procedure chosen by the President for the referendum is also questionable. To
understand why this is so, consider if the President would agree to a consultative
referendum on whether he should be brought before the State Tribunal, or on whether he is
able to continue to discharge his duties?
His answers to such a request would likely be “No!”, mainly because affirmative answers to
the two referendum questions (if the referendum were binding) would make it impossible
for him to continue to discharge the duties of his office – at least for some time. The
President’s legal advisers would doubtless respond that the Polish Constitution provides for
special procedures for finding that the President is unable to discharge his duties. And they
would be right: Article 131 states that the Constitutional Tribunal will, on the request of the
Speaker of the Lower House of Parliament, determine whether or not there is any
impediment to the President holding office, while permanent incapacity is determined by the
National Assembly; Article 145 allows for bringing the President before the State Tribunal
on the application of 140 members of the National Assembly with the votes of a two-third
majority of the statutory number of members.
Thus, even the President’s legal advisors would argue that using a referendum to remove
him from office would be circumvention of the Constitution. In this I fully agree with them.
Why then is the Polish President proposing a consultative referendum that could lead to the
current Constitution being questioned, if that same Constitution provides for a special
amendment procedure? The terms of that procedure are laid out in Article 235: the National
Assembly adopts amendments to the constitution, and in some cases an amendment is
then put to an approving (not consultative) referendum. Thus, as would be the case with
questioning the current President’s right to hold office, using a consultative referendum to
amend the Constitution is circumvention of that very Constitution, not to say an abuse.
If a referendum to remove the President from office is constitutionally pointless, then the
referendum to be held on 10 and 11 November is equally pointless. The Constitution is a
rationally functioning whole and if it provides a specific procedure for any measure, this
procedure should be applied. To do otherwise is to engage in an inadmissible
circumvention of the Constitution, and a reductio ad absurdum of matters of State.
One can certainly proclaim that the issue of whether the President is able to hold office and
whether he should stand before the State Tribunal are matters “of particular importance to
the State” and thus matters for which Article 125 of the Constitution allows a consultative
referendum to be held. If one takes that path, the arguments presented by the President to
justify a referendum on the Constitution could be used to justify a referendum removing him
from office: there are no taboos, everything should be discussed, Poland needs a President
for the 21st century, the current incumbent is outdated, my son did not vote for him and
would like to have his own, to date Poles have voted for candidate selected and groomed
by the elite, and in the referendum they could be asked who their dream candidate would
be (e.g. what sport he should play and whether he should respect the Constitution). This
hardly seems a good direction for a modern state to take.
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